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Abstract. This paper uses an administrative dataset from the Slovak Republic on
durations of individual unemployment spells. The focus of the analysis is on the
effect of the duration of temporary subsidized jobs on the job finding rate of
unemployed workers. It appears that the duration of the temporary jobs is an
important determinant of the speed by which unemployed workers find regular
jobs. In this sense shorter temporary jobs are more effective than long temporary
jobs. The main reason for this is probably that temporary jobs with a long
duration induce workers in the first period on the temporary job to search less
intensive for a regular job than temporary jobs with a short duration do.
 Keywords: unemployment, active labor market policy, temporary subsidized jobs,
duration modelsActive labor market policies in Slovakia
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1 Introduction
Temporary subsidized jobs aim to improve the labor market position of
unemployed workers. Subsidized jobs, both in the market sector and the
government sector affect the job opportunities of unemployed workers because of
the increased number of jobs available. Furthermore, they may upgrade individual
unemployed workers when there is a training element involved. The work
experience that unemployed workers collect on a subsidized job may also make
them more valuable for employers. Employers in search for new employees may
prefer workers who have been on temporary subsidized jobs to other unemployed
workers. If they find a regular job more quickly temporary subsidized jobs can be
considered as a "treatment" for unemployed workers.
This paper uses an administrative dataset from the Slovak Republic on durations
of individual unemployment spells. The focus is on the individual treatment
effects from temporary subsidized jobs. The Slovak labor market is one of the
transitional labor markets of Central and Eastern Europe (see Svejnar (1999) for
an overview). Like many other countries with a transitional economy, Slovakia
experienced a sharp increase of unemployment at the initial stage of the transition.
In the course of 1991, unemployment increased from practically zero to 300,000
persons which corresponded to an unemployment rate of about 12% (OECD
1996).
In the course of the 1990s the Slovak government introduced a range of ALMP.
Important elements of these ALMP were temporary subsidized jobs known as
socially purposeful jobs (SPJ) and publicly useful jobs (PUJ). SPJ were mainly
created in the private sector and concerned higher qualified functions while PUJ
were low ranking jobs in the public sector best described as "community works"
(OECD (1996)). ALMP were introduced in 1991 and gradually developed into a
comprehensive system of several programs. SPJ were the most important
throughout the period, both in terms of number of created jobs and expenditures.
The maximum duration of PUJ changed from 6 months at the introduction to 9
months later on and finally to 12 months. The last major re-organization occurred
in 1997 when SPJ and PUJ were combined into one program of subsidized jobs.
There have been some studies on the impact of ALMP in transition economies, but
there is not an abundant number. From an overview of studies on labor-market
reforms in transition economics Boeri (1997) concludes that active policies, such
as subsidized employment schemes and public work programs have not been very
successful. According to Boeri this may have to do with the phenomenon that slots
in training courses are often offered to job seekers with rather favorable labor
market characteristics who would have found a job anyway. Furthermore,J. C. van Ours
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participation in ALMP may stigmatize the participants, which will reduce their
chances of finding a regular job. The effectiveness of Slovak labor market policies
has been investigated in a number of studies. In Lubyova and Van Ours (1999) the
effects of PUJ, SPJ and training on the transition rate from unemployment to a
regular job are investigated. The main conclusion is that PUJ have a positive effect
on the job finding rate. In Van Ours (2000) the effects of ALMP are studied more
closely, by also investigating whether the separation rate from a new job is related
to whether or not the worker previously participated in an ALMP. Here the
conclusion is that PUJ reduce the job separation rate. The current paper focuses on
the job finding rate. The main issue addressed here is the question why PUJ have a
positive effect on the job-finding rate while SPJ have a negative effect. Possible
explanations are the length of the subsidized jobs that differs or the difference in
characteristics between workers flowing into the two categories. To investigate the
effect of the duration I exploit the changes in the maximum length of PUJ that
were introduced in the first half of the 1990s. I use a sample of 3 Slovak districts
of which I have detailed labor market information with respect to the workers that
started their unemployment spell in 1993. I focus on the labor market position of
male workers.
The paper is set up as follows. Section 2 provides stylized facts about the system
of passive and active labor market policies in Slovakia. I also discuss the results
from a previous study on the effects of Slovak ALMP. Section 3 describes the data
and the sampling procedure. Section 4 gives some stylized facts. Section 5
presents the statistical model and Section 6 presents the estimation results. Section
7 concludes.
2  Labor market policies
The Slovak Republic has a system of passive and active labor market policies. The
system of unemployment benefits in the Slovak Republic has been discussed
elsewhere (for a detailed description of institutions I refer the reader to OECD
(1996)). For the current paper I only note that for many unemployed workers
replacement rates are quite high. Even for average wage jobs the replacement ratio
for adults with children and unemployment benefits was no less than about 80%.
After transfer to the social assistance benefits their replacement ratio was about
50-60% (for more details see Lubyova and Van Ours (1997, 1998)).
Active labor market policies consist of a range of measures from subsidized jobs
to training. I focus on SPJ and PUJ. SPJ were subsidized jobs in the private sector.
The concept of SPJ and the rules of administration have undergone numerous
revisions as the authorities learned how to tailor the programs to labor market
conditions. In 1991 SPJ were considered to be every job created on the basis of an
agreement with the labor office by an employer in production, business or other
activities aimed at making profits. In 1992 the profit-seeking requirement was
eliminated and the requirement that the job had to be occupied by registeredActive labor market policies in Slovakia
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unemployed was introduced. The latter was partially relaxed in 1994 when the
school-leavers, persons younger than 18 years and those who would be full-time
self-employed under SPJ were allowed to participate without prior registration.
The main forms of support introduced in 1991 were subsidies, interest repayments
and loans, later reduced to 2-years loans and subsidies. The minimum duration of
SPJ was introduced in 1992 and set to 2-years period. In case of lay-off or quit, the
job had to be occupied by another registered unemployed within 30 days.
Publicly useful jobs were designed mostly for lower qualified workers for a
limited period of time. In 1991 PUJ were introduced as short-term employment
opportunities created on the basis of agreements between labor offices and non-
profit employers (for example, organs of state administration, municipalities, and
local administration). The requirement for non-profit orientation of the employer
was canceled in 1992. State budgetary organizations and state contributory (partial
budgetary) organizations were excluded from PUJ programs in 1994. The upper
limit for financial support was originally set at the wage costs of the participant,
later extended to cover also participant's social insurance contributions. The
maximum duration of PUJ in 1991 was 6 months. Given that the participation
renewed unemployment benefit entitlement, many unemployed workers were
shifting between PUJ and open unemployment. Therefore, the maximum duration
of PUJ was raised to 9 months in 1994 and to 12 months in 1995. The stocks were
strongly built up after two major inflows of about the same size, which occurred in
the financing boom of 1992, and in the first half of 1995. The latter inflow was a
result of changed priorities in 1995 - more means were put into PUJ, partly at the
expense of other programs.
The implementation of ALMP was in the hands of the Public Employment Service
(PES) that had a network of district offices where every district office had a
number of local centers. So, the services were never far away (OECD (1996)).
Although priority of placement was given to long-term unemployed workers, the
target group of the wage subsidies was not limited to the long-term unemployed.
Every unemployed person who could not get a normal job was entitled to a
subsidized job offered through the PES system. According to the OECD (1996)
the incentive to establish a subsidized job usually came from interested employers.
Among the subsidized jobs were jobs that required no special training and
education, including caretaking, cleaning, kitchen work and unskilled jobs in
general. The creation of subsidized jobs was a matter of negotiation between
employers and PES. The wage subsidy was granted to individuals but paid to the
employer. The wage was comparable to other workers that had a low skilled
industrial job and was usually at the minimum wage or somewhat above. This
means that for some workers the replacement rate was quite high. If someone
refused a job offered by the PES he or she may have gotten a benefit sanction
imposed but the labor offices were usually reluctant to use this instrument.J. C. van Ours
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In 1997 the structure of ALMP programs was substantially reformed. The original
SPJ and PUJ were formally unified into one program of subsidized jobs, although
some distinction between the two types of jobs was preserved.
3  Data
The data used in our analysis come from the unemployment registers of labor
offices in three Slovak districts. The first district is Bratislava (excluding the
capital Bratislava) with a December 1993 unemployment rate of 4.1%, the second
district is Dolny Kubin with an unemployment rate of 12.9% and the third district
is Bardejov with an unemployment rate of 19.3%.
In the selected districts the data collection was exhaustive, i.e. all the registered
unemployed were selected. Several types of information are used in order to
reconstruct individual histories. An individual history consists of a sequence of
spells representing three possible labor market states: employment, unemployment
and out of labor force. In addition to that the spells of participation in SPJ and PUJ
programs are identified. From the unemployment register and unemployment
archives an inflow sample was selected of all the unemployed that became
registered in the course of 1993. The censoring point is April 1998. The use of
1993 inflow is justified by the relative stability in the institutional set-up of the
labor market (major reforms occurred at the beginning of 1992 and 1995).
Another reason was a sufficient time period elapsed before the censoring point in
order to avoid large shares of censored spells. In the analysis I use information
about the length of the first spell of unemployment that started in 1993 and if this
spell ended about the labor market status after unemployment. If the spell ended in
a transition to a job the unemployment spell was considered to be completed. If
the spell ended in a transition to an ALMP-program the unemployment duration
was considered to continue until another transition occurred either to a job or back
to unemployment. When a transition to a job occurred the unemployment spell
was considered to be complete. When a transition occurred back to unemployment
the spell was still considered to be incomplete. In the analysis the duration of
unemployment up to a transition to an ALMP-job or to training is also important.
This duration is the search period until an ALMP measure is met. If the spell did
not end or ended in a transition to out of the labor force the unemployment spell is
considered to be right censored.
The explanatory variables I use in the analysis refer to age, education and marital
status. Appendix 1 gives details about our dataset. As shown there, on average
35% of the unemployed in our sample was younger than 30 years, 59% had a
lower education and 58% was married. Apart from the unemployment rate the
largest differences between the unemployed in the three districts seem to be age or
age-related. In Bratislava on average the unemployed are older than in the other
two districts, they are lower educated and have a higher share of married man.
Table 1 gives some indication about the transitions in labor market statuses that
were used in the analysis. Over the period of observation 332 unemployed enteredActive labor market policies in Slovakia
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a PUJ, 275 entered a SPJ and 3525 unemployed found a regular job without
having been on an ALMP program. For 746 unemployed the unemployment spell
is right censored. There are several reasons for the spells to be considered as right
censored. Some of them really are right censored in the sense that at the end of the
sample period they were still unemployed. Other workers have left unemployment
with unknown destination. Then, there are people who left unemployment and re-
entered immediately, probably for administrative reasons.
Furthermore, Table 1 shows that of the 332 unemployed workers that have been
on a PUJ 128 entered a regular job, 177 entered a regular job after being on a SPJ
and 132 entered a regular job after being on a training program. The remaining
spells are considered to be right censored unemployment spells. A lot of
unemployed workers that have found a regular job during the sampling period
have lost their job and reentered unemployment.
4. Stylized facts
Figure 1 shows quarterly transition rates from unemployment. From Figure 1a it
appears that the transition rate to a regular job peaks in the second quarter. After
the second quarter this transition rate gradually declines. Figure 1a also shows the
transition rate to other destinations (including the transition to training1), that has a
similar pattern. Maybe the peak in both transition rates has to do with the
expiration of unemployment benefits after 6 months.  The transition rates to PUJ
and SPJ are rather low and therefore are also shown separately from the other
transition rates in Figure 1b. From this figure it appears that both transition rates
are remarkably different from each other. The transition rate to SPJ is about 0.02
in the first quarter, so 2% of the 1993 inflow into unemployment goes to SPJ
already in the first quarter. After that the transitions to SPJ gradually decline. The
transition rate to PUJ is almost zero in the fist quarter, but increases strongly in
subsequent quarters. After 2 years of unemployment the transition rate to PUJ is 6
times as high as the transition rate to SPJ.
Figure 2 shows the transitions to a regular job from both PUJ and SPJ. These are
direct transitions, before the temporary job expires. The figure shows that the
transition rate from SPJ is rather low in the first quarter. After that this transition
rate rises from 5% to 15% to be practically constant with the exception of the
fourth interval when the transition rate is about 10%. The transition rate from PUJ
to regular jobs is quite different. This transition rate is about 35% in the first
quarter and goes down afterwards. Except for the third quarter the transition rate
from PUJ to regular jobs is always higher than the transition rate from SPJ.
                                                          
1 I consider transitions to training as right censored unemployment durations. Though in
theory training is an active labour market policy in practice I serious doubts about the
way people are selected for these programmes. See Van Ours (2000) for more details.J. C. van Ours
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Figure 3 also presents information about transition rates from SPJ and PUJ to
regular jobs, but now also indirect transitions are included. This means that
transitions from SPJ and PUJ to unemployment or to withdrawal from the labor
market, that are later followed by a transfer to a regular job are also taken into
account. Figure 3a show the cumulative probability to transfer to regular jobs
conditional on having started on SPJ or PUJ. The direct transfer from PUJ levels
off after 2 quarters, while the total transfers level off after 8 quarters at about 70%.
The transfers from SPJ are much lower in the beginning but increase over a longer
period. After 3 years the cumulative transition probability to a regular job is about
90%.
Figure 3b gives similar information about cumulative transfers from PUJ and SPJ
to regular jobs, but now distinguished by year of start on the temporary subsidized
job. I make a distinction between a start in 1994 and a start in 1995 or a later year.
There are insufficient observations of starts in 1993 to include them in the graph.
For SPJ there is no institutional difference between 1994 and later years, but for
PUJ there is. In 1994 PUJ lasted maximum 9 months, from 1995 onwards this was
maximum 12 months. Figure 3b shows that the cumulative transition probability
from SPJ has the same pattern irrespective of the starting year. For PUJ there is a
remarkable difference. The level of transition from the 1994-PUJ is substantially
higher than the level of transition from the 1995-onwards-PUJ. Since there is
hardly any difference for SPJ the labor market conditions are probably very much
the same when comparing 1994 and later periods. Therefore, as a preliminary
conclusion I infer from Figure 3b that the ex ante length does matter. The shorter
ex ante length in 1994 may have induced higher transition rates from PUJ. We
will consider this in more detail below.
5. Statistical model
We consider an ALMP program as a 'treatment' that may affect the behavior of the
unemployed workers. In order to establish the effect of an ALMP program on the
exit rate from unemployment to a regular job we have to set-up a model that
accounts for possible selectivity in the inflow into ALMP. Heckman et al. (1999)
gives an overview of the relevant issues when one wants to establish treatment
effects. There have been many treatment effect studies but studies that estimate
the effects of the treatment in the context of an event history model of labor force
dynamics are rare2. In my analysis I exploit information with respect to the
duration of unemployment, the duration of the stay in an ALMP, the destinations
after that and the duration of a subsequent employment spell. In multivariate
duration models the variation in the durations at which treatment is administered
to individuals, and data on the corresponding pre- and post-treatment durations
can be exploited to identify the treatment effect. The intuition is as follows.
                                                          
2 An early example of the use of duration models in an evaluation study is Ridder (1986).Active labor market policies in Slovakia
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Consider the transition rate from unemployment to a regular job, which is affected
by unobserved heterogeneity that has a discrete distribution with two points of
support. Consider also the transition rate from unemployment to an ALMP that is
affected by a similar type of unobserved heterogeneity. If the two types of
unobserved heterogeneity are correlated this means that conditional on observed
characteristics there are four groups of individuals that differ in terms of transition
to a job (high/low) and transition to an ALMP (high/low). Conditional on
observed characteristics each of these four groups is homogenous. So, within the
groups selectivity of the inflow into an ALMP cannot be present. Therefore, we
are able to estimate the unbiased effect of the ALMP on the transition rate from
unemployment to a regular job if we can identify the unobserved heterogeneity in
both the transition rate to a regular job and the transition rates to ALMP. This
means that the data should contain information about all relevant transitions over
some period of time, which they do3.
A formal proof of the identification of the treatment effect is given in Abbring and
Van den Berg (1998). Van den Berg (2000) presents an overview of duration
models and has a general discussion on the use of duration models in estimating
treatment effects. He indicates that in order to avoid biased estimates of the impact
of ALMPs on unemployment durations it is necessary that individuals do not
behave in anticipation to future events.
Examples of the use of multivariate duration models in evaluation studies are
Gritz (1993), Bonnal et al. (1997), Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1997),
Van den Berg, Van der Klaauw and Van Ours (1998). These and other studies are
discussed in more detail in Van Ours (2000)
I start with a simple version of the model in Van Ours (2000)4. The baseline
model has for every transition rate a proportional specification with a flexible
baseline hazard. Differences between unemployed individuals in the transition rate
from unemployment to a job can be characterized by the observed characteristics
x, the elapsed duration of unemployment itself5, and a variable indicating whether
or not the individual started participating in an ALMP. I assume x to be time-
invariant. Furthermore, ta (a = PUJ, SPJ) is the time at which the individual starts
participating in an ALMP and I(ta<t) is the dummy variable indicating whether the
individual has already started participating. I use a similar specification for the
transition rate to PUJ and SPJ.
                                                          
3 If all unemployed would enter an ALMP at the same elapsed duration of unemployment
we could not identify potential selectivity.
4 The model in the current paper is more simple because I do not consider the effects of
ALMP on job separation rates.
5 As indicated above in the calculation of the unemployment duration I add the time spend
during ALMP. So, if t1 is the unemployment spell until entering an ALMP-program, t2
is the time spend in the program and t3 is the time unemployed after the program and
before entering a regular job, total unemployment duration t = t1+t2+t3.J. C. van Ours
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The transition rate from unemployment to a regular job at time t conditional on x
and ta, the transition rate to SPJ or PUJ at time t conditional on x can be specified
as follows:
θ ue(t; x, ta) = λ ue (t).exp(x’β ue + δ ue,a.I(ta<t))
θ a(t; x) = λ a (t).exp(x’β a)( 1 )
where the λ j(t)-functions, j = ue, a represent individual duration dependence and
δ ue,a measures the effect that participation in an ALMP has on the transition rate
from unemployment to a regular job. In both cases I assume the treatment to be an
incidence effect (Gritz (1993))6. There could be a lot of aspects of the ALMP that
potentially affect the transition rate to a regular job and the job separation rate, but
I only take the effect of the participation in an ALMP into account. Flexible
duration dependence is modeled by using step functions:
λ j (t) = exp(Σ k( λ j,k Ik(t)) (2)
where j = ue, a is an indicator for the type of transition, k (= 1,..,4) is a subscript
for time-intervals and Ik(t) are time-varying dummy variables that are one in
subsequent time-intervals. I distinguish four time intervals: 1-2 quarters, 3-4
quarters, 4-8 quarters and 8+ quarters7. Because a constant term is also estimated I
normalize λ ue,1=λ a,1=λ eu,1=0.
The conditional density functions of the completed unemployment durations tu,
and the completed durations until entrance of an ALMP can be written as
ƒ ue (tu; x, ta) = θ ue(tu; x, ta) exp(- 0∫  
tu θ ue(s; x, ta) ds)
ƒ a (ta; x) = θ a(ta; x) exp(- 0∫  
ta θ a(s; x) ds) (3)
Since we have an inflow sample and the transition rates are uncorrelated, the log-
likelihood L of the model factorizes where the components are specified as
Lj = dj.∑  log(ƒ j ) + (1-dj).∑  log(1-Fj)( 4 )
where the Fj’s  are distribution functions, dj is a dummy variable with a value of 1
if the transition j is completed and a value zero is the duration of the spell is right
censored.
                                                          
6 Note that because of this the changes in the length of PUJ-jobs that occured in the course
of time do not have to be taken into account explicitly.
7 The intervals were chosen because they are related to the social security system (the
workers that became unemployed during 1993 had a UB-entitlement period of 6
months) or because of convention (the border line between short-term and long-term
unemployment is 1 year, the border line between long-term and very-long-term is 2
years).Active labor market policies in Slovakia
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In the second model I allow for unobserved heterogeneity to affect the transitions
to both a regular job and to one of the ALMP programs:
 θ ue(t; x, u, ta) = λ ue (t).exp(x’β ue + δ ue,a.I(ta<t) + u)
θ a(t; x, va) = λ a (t).exp(x’β a + va)( 5 )
where u, and va are the components of unobserved heterogeneity in the
transitions. These components are assumed to follow a discrete distribution with
two points of support (pj and 1-pj).
The basic assumption so far is that the inflow into the ALMP programs is a
random process in the sense that it is independent of the process by which
unemployed find jobs and subsequently loose jobs. The selection into the
treatment-program is assumed to be exogenous and not dependent on unobserved
characteristics that also affect the job finding rate. In other words, conditional on
observed characteristics and the duration of unemployment the quality of the
unemployed flowing into an ALMP is as good (or as bad) as the quality of the
unemployed workers that remain unemployed. Then, if there is an effect of an
ALMP (δ ue,a ≠  0), this is a ‘true’ effect. This effect can go both ways. If  δ ue,a < 0
the ALMP has a negative effect on the re-employment hazard, which could be
caused by stigmatization. If δ ue,a > 0 the workers on an ALMP have a higher exit
rate to a job than the non-participants. Note that in the specification of the hazard
in equations (1) and (5) the effect of an ALMP occurs immediately. Also note that
I consider the duration of a stay in an ALMP as extended unemployment duration.
This concept does not coincide with the official statistics but I take the point of
view of a labor economist: a person is unemployed until he or she finds a regular
job or leaves the labor market.
In the second model the unobserved heterogeneity terms are allowed to be
correlated. Now selectivity in the inflow into one of the ALMP programs is
accounted for. If unobserved characteristics have a negative effect on the job
finding rate and a positive effect on the transition rate to an ALMP, then
conditional on the observed characteristics and the elapsed duration of
unemployment the average quality of the workers in an ALMP is lower than the
average quality of workers who do not enter an ALMP. Then, if one would simply
compare the transition rates to regular jobs of both groups one compares workers
with unfavorable characteristics and ALMP with workers with more favorable
characteristics and no ALMP. Therefore, one would underestimate the true effect
of participating in an ALMP. The opposite effect is also possible. One can
imagine that the people in control of the entrance to ALMP want their programs to
be a success. Therefore they prefer workers with good characteristics to flow into
their program. This implies that there is a positive correlation between the
unobserved heterogeneity components in both transition rates. Then, the effect of
an ALMP program is overestimated. G(u,va) is defined to be the joint distribution
of the unobserved characteristics u and va. Then, the joint density function of tue
and ta conditional on x equalsJ. C. van Ours
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ƒ ue,a (tue, ta |  x; u, va, ta) =  ∫ u  ∫ va  ƒ ue (tue |  x, u, ta) ƒ a (ta|  x, va) dG(u,va,) (6)
Each of the error terms is assumed to follow a discrete distribution with two points
of support, and each error term can be correlated to another. I assume that there is
perfect correlation. Therefore, G is a discrete distribution of unobserved





probabilities are denoted as follows:
Pr(u=u
a, v=va
a) = p1   Pr(u=u
b, v=va
a) = p8 (7)
where 0 ≤  pi ≤  1 and ∑ i pi = 1, i = 1,2. The set-up of the likelihood is similar to the
one presented in equation (4). Note that because of the introduction of correlated
unobserved heterogeneity it is not possible to factorize the likelihood as we did for
the previous model, so we have to estimate all the coefficients jointly.
6  Estimation results
Of all the workers in our sample we have information with respect to the length of
the unemployment spell, the destination after the unemployment spell, the length
of the subsequent spell, et cetera. On the basis of this information we estimate the
coefficients of the models presented in the previous section using the method of
maximum likelihood. Apart from the personal characteristics age, education and
marital status we also include fixed effects for two of the three districts in the
analysis.
I started with a re-estimation of the model in Van Ours (2000), to illustrate the
effects of omitting training as a separate ALMP and not including the job
separation process. The results of the re-estimation are given in Appendix 2 and
the parameter estimates of the explanatory variables are almost the same as in the
original estimates. The parameter estimates for the transition rate to a job indicate
that age is not relevant for this transition. Furthermore, low educated unemployed
workers have a smaller transition rate to a job than workers with an incomplete,
secondary or higher education. Married men have a higher job finding rate than
their counterparts. In the districts with a high unemployment rate the direct
transition to a regular job is smaller than in districts with a lower unemployment
rate. There is also some negative duration dependence in the transition rate from
unemployment to a job. However it is only the first six months in which the
transition rate is significantly higher than later on. Beyond six months the job
finding rate is sort of constant. Finally, it appears that unemployed that have
entered a PUJ have a significantly higher transition rate to a job than those that did
not have a PUJ. Unemployed that entered a SPJ have a lower transition rate to a
regular job than those that did not. So, as before the re-estimation results indicate
the PUJ increase the job-finding rate, while SPJ decreases it.
For the transition rate to a PUJ the only personal characteristic that has a
coefficient significantly different from zero is the dummy for secondary andActive labor market policies in Slovakia
12
higher education. As was to be expected lower educated unemployed workers
have a higher transition rate into PUJ. There is positive duration dependence in the
transition rate to PUJ. The transition rate in the first six months is substantially
below the one in later periods. SPJ and training have higher entrance rates for
younger, higher educated and married unemployed.
Appendix 2 also shows the estimation results for the model in which possible
selectivity is accounted for. The estimation results indicated that there is hardly
any selectivity in the inflow into ALMP. The two mass points in the job finding
rate are very close to each other. The two mass points for the transition into PUJ
differ, because there seems to be a group of unemployed that never go into PUJ.
The same holds for the transition rate to SPJ, the non-entrance group being
complementary to the non-entrance group to PUJ. Allowing for selectivity does
not affect the so-called treatment effects of SPJ and PUJ. Therefore, in the
remainder I proceed with a simple model that does not allow for selectivity and I
concentrate on the way in which the SPJ and PUJ are modeled in the job finding
rate.
The results with respect to SPJ and PUJ seem to be counterintuitive since PUJ
were focused on disadvantaged groups while SPJ were targeted on unemployed
with favorable labor market prospects. However, in the empirical model the
explanatory variables account for some of the differences with respect to labor
market prospects. And, perhaps the SPJ were too much like regular jobs. The PUJ
effects could have to do with signaling. The workers on PUJ may have
unfavorable labor market characteristics, by accepting a PUJ the unemployed
worker signals a positive attitude towards work.
To investigate to what extent the differences between the effects of PUJ and SPJ
can be attributed to differences in the ex ante duration of these jobs, I start with re-
estimating a model that allows for these effects to depend on the year of entrance
into on of these jobs. Since the other parameter estimates turned out to be hardly
affected by the specification of the PUJ and SPJ-effects I only report coefficients
of these effects ignoring the other parameter estimates. The estimation results are
shown in Table 2. The first column gives the treatment effects if we ignore the
differences in starting year and are merely a replication of the estimate without
unobserved heterogeneity presented in Appendix 2. The second column shows
that the year in which the worker started on a temporary job makes a difference.
For PUJ that started in 1993 the treatment effect is the largest, for PUJ that started
in 1995 or thereafter the treatment effect is the smallest. This order is consistent
with the increase in the ex ante duration of the PUJ, which was the smallest in
1993 and the largest since 1995. The negative treatment effect of SPJ that started
in 1993 is the same as those that started in 1994, while those that started in 1995
do not have a negative treatment effect at all. If we compare the values of the
loglikelihoods of both estimation results in Table 2, it is clear that those in the
second column are significantly better than those in the first column.J. C. van Ours
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To investigate the treatment effects further I replaced the dummies used in the
second column of Table 2 by a linear relationship between the treatment effect and
the ex ante duration of the temporary job. The estimation results are shown in the
first column of Table 3. They indicate that for every quarter of duration of a
temporary job the treatment effect is reduced by 0.25, so that for 5 quarter
temporary jobs the treatment effect is almost zero and from 6 quarters onward the
treatment effect is negative. Of course it may be that the relationship between ex
ante duration and treatment effect is non-linear, but the variation in ex ante
duration is insufficient to pursue this point.
The second column of Table 3 shows what happens if I introduce personal
characteristics in the treatment effect. The negative effect of the ex ante duration is
somewhat smaller but still significantly different from zero. Furthermore it
appears that for young workers the treatment effect is larger than for workers older
than 30 years of age. The educational level and marital status are irrelevant, but
the geographical area matters. In district 3 the treatment effect is substantially
smaller than in the other two districts.
7  Conclusions
This paper studies job-finding rates of male workers in three districts in the Slovak
Republic. The main interest is in the effect that ALMP-programs have on job
finding rates. PUJ and SPJ are used as a treatment to stimulate unemployed
workers to find a regular job. It is important to evaluate whether the treatment
actually works. SPJ appear to have a negative effect on the job finding rate. PUJ
seem to be the most efficient active labor market policy. Workers that are or have
been on a PUJ have a higher job finding rate than other unemployed workers have.
The focus of the paper is on the difference in effect between PUJ and SPJ. PUJ are
substantially shorter in duration than SPJ are. It appears that the duration of the
temporary jobs is an important determinant of the speed by which unemployed
workers find regular jobs. In this sense shorter temporary jobs are more effective
than long temporary jobs. The main reason for this is probably that temporary jobs
with a long duration induce workers in the first period on the temporary job to
search less intensive for a regular job than temporary jobs with a short duration
do.Active labor market policies in Slovakia
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Appendix 1- Definition and means of variables of the 1993 inflow sample from the
three Slovak districts; males
All variables are dummy variables (with value 1 where indicated and value 0 for the
reference group)
Definitions of variables
Age<30: age is below 30 years as measured in 1998
Reference group age: age is 30 years or more in 1998
Incomplete secondary education
Secondary and higher education (including university)
Reference group education: no education - basic education – apprentice
Married: married or cohabiting person
Reference group marital status: single-divorced – widow/widower - unknown
Means of variables Bratislava Dolny Kubin Bardejov Total
(Number of observations) (1499)     (1902) (1656) (5057)
Age < 30 years 0.23     0.39 0.42 0.35
Age ≥  30 years 0.77     0.61 0.58  0.65
Lower education 0.72     0.72 0.32  0.59
Incomplete sec education 0.06     0.06 0.40 0.17
Sec and higher education 0.22     0.22 0.28 0.24
Married 0.70     0.58 0.46 0.58
Other marital status 0.30     0.42 0.54 0.42
Unemployment rate (%) 4.1     12.9 19.3 12.4J. C. van Ours
17
Appendix 2 Results re-estimating the model of Van Ours (2000)
    JOB     PUJ     SPJ
Age<30 -0.02 (0.5) -0.06 (0.5)  0.30 (2.0)
Inc Sec ed.  0.22 (4.0) -0.33 (1.5)  0.74 (4.0)
Sec higher ed.  0.15 (3.8) -0.44 (2.7)  0.59 (4.1)
Married  0.17 (4.6) -0.22 (1.8)  0.43 (2.9)
District 2 -0.08 (2.1) -0.02 (0.1) -0.10 (0.7)
District 3 -0.52 (10.5) -0.12 (0.7) -0.32 (1.7)
Mass points -2.47 (52.6) -6.81 (24.7) -5.46 (28.8)
3-4  Quarters -0.27 (6.2)  1.75 (6.3) -0.42 (2.6)
4-8 Quarters -0.37 (8.1)  2.69 (10.1) -0.56 (3.2)
8+ Quarters -0.39 (6.8)  3.41 (12.7) -0.65 (2.4)
SPJ-treatment -0.57 (7.7)  
PUJ-treatment  0.41 (3.8)
-Loglikelihood                                                              17,431.2                                                       
Age<30 -0.02 (0.5) -0.21 (1.3)  0.31 (2.0)
Inc Sec ed.  0.22 (4.0) -0.38 (1.6)  0.77 (3.9)
Sec higher ed.  0.15 (3.7) -0.49 (2.6)  0.58 (3.7)
Married  0.17 (4.5) -0.45 (2.9)  0.46 (2.9)
District 2 -0.08 (2.1) -0.05 (0.3) -0.10 (0.6)
District 3 -0.52 (10.5) -0.24 (1.2) -0.30 (1.5)
Mass point 1 -2.46 (15.3) -6.02 (15.5)      -∞
Masspoint 2 -2.47 (17.6)        -∞ -4.65 (11.9)
3-4 Quarters -0.27 (6.2)  1.72 (6.1) -0.38 (2.2)
4-8 Quarters -0.37 (8.1)  2.68 (9.6) -0.54 (2.6)
8+ Quarters -0.39 (6.3)  3.68 (11.9) -0.84 (2.5)
SPJ-treatment -0.58 (3.6)
PUJ-treatment  0.42 (2.3)
Probability    0.44 (2.7)
-Loglikelihood                                                              17,430.5                                                       Active labor market policies in Slovakia
18
Table 1 Transitions in the sample; numbers of workers in different subsequent
labor market states
a)
State 1 State 2 State 3
E (128) PUJ (332)
C (204): unknown (7), SPJ (1),
PUJ (40),  U (114),  c (42)
E (177) SPJ (275)
C (98): unknown (30), SPJ (3),
U (61),  c (4)
U (2452) E (3525)
C (1073): unknown (1),
E (776), c (296)
U (5057)
C (925): unknown (462)
U (240), c (44), Tr (179)
a) E = regular job, U = unemployed, PUJ = publicly useful job, SPJ = socially purposeful job, Tr
= training, C = considered to be censored, c = actually censored
Table 2 Estimation results extended PUJ- and SPJ-effects
     I     II
PUJ  0.41 (4.2)
SPJ -0.57 (8.2)
PUJ*start ’93  1.52 (4.6)
PUJ*start ’94  1.03 (6.1)
PUJ*start ≥ ’95 -0.23 (1.6)
SPJ*start ’93 -0.64 (7.5)
SPJ*start ’94 -0.66 (7.5)
SPJ*start ≥ ’95 -0.00 (0.0)
-Loglikelihood 13,954.4 13,922.0J. C. van Ours
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Table 3 Estimation results extended PUJ- and SPJ-effects (continued)
    I     II
Constant  1.38 (8.0)  1.09 (4.8)
Ex ante duration  -0.25 (10.2) -0.20 (6.6)
Age<30  0.38 (2.4)
Inc Sec ed. -0.25 (1.3)
Sec higher ed. -0.11 (0.6)
Married    0.09 (0.6)
District 2  0.11 (0.6)
District 3 -0.74 (4.1)
-Loglikelihood    13,943.2    13,918.61
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Figure 3b Cumulative inflow to job by year of 
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